Cambodia by Hughes, Caroline
Cambodia
Caroline Hughes
IDS Bulletin Volume 37  Number 2  March 2006  © Institute of Development Studies
1 Cambodia’s performance
Cambodia embarked upon concurrent processes of
economic liberalisation, conflict resolution and
political reform from 1989 in response to geopolitical
shifts associated with the end of the Cold War. The
country had been isolated from the West under an
international trade and aid embargo during the
1980s. In the early 1990s, a United Nations
peacekeeping operation and a lifting of the
international embargo resulted in the pumping of
US$ 3billion in international aid into Cambodia over
the following ten years. However, the outcome vis-
à-vis turnaround has been equivocal.
‘Turnaround’ is defined as successful promotion of
sustainable economic growth, improvement in
human development indices and cessation of violent
conflict. Superficially, Cambodia’s performance has
been creditable since 1989. The civil warfare of
1970–99 has ended. Economic growth has remained
above 5 per cent per annum in almost every year
since 1994. Human development indices show
improvement. However, the sustainability of this
performance is unclear. Return to civil warfare seems
unlikely but continued rapid growth in the economy
and in human development is uncertain, unless major
governance reforms occur. This article argues that
the success of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) in achieving sustainable cessation of armed
conflict has been achieved by means that have made
good governance less likely.
The improved economic growth and human
development figures posted represent, to a great
extent, a one-off peace dividend, from the very low
base of the 1980s. The deployment of thousands of
UN peacekeepers to Cambodia in 1992 prompted a
so-called ‘UNTAC boom’ (United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia). Rapid expansion in
construction and services, largely tailored to servicing
international personnel, and concentrated narrowly
on the capital city of Phnom Penh produced high
growth rates in the early 1990s. From a peak of 9
per cent in 1994, growth rates declined as political
instability within the ruling coalition formed after the
1993 elections emerged in the mid-1990s. Growth
rates troughed in 1997 and 1998, as fighting broke
out between the coalition parties in July 1997,
prompting the flight of leaders of Funcinpec Party –
the senior coalition partner – and their subsequent
return in 1998 for elections conducted in a tense
atmosphere.
Following the 1998 elections, and the return of a
new government dominated by the party of state of
the 1980s, the CPP, growth rates soared again,
bolstered by high growth in the garment industry, in
response to Cambodia’s excess export quotas to the
USA. Some service growth was also seen, focused
narrowly upon Phnom Penh and the town of Siem
Reap, near the Angkor Wat temples, as better
security encouraged tourists to return. Agriculture –
the largest sector of the economy – declined, apart
from a single record harvest, brought about by good
weather conditions in 1999.
Although due credit must be given for these
achievements, it is important to note the importance
of the one-off boost to the economy given by the
deployment of peacekeepers and by the return of
peace. Significant also is the ongoing importance of
contingent factors. In agriculture production remains
heavily dependent on the weather, reflecting a lack
of investment in technology, such as effective
irrigation systems or flood defences to offset the
effects of too little or too much rain. The only
flourishing industry – garment manufacturing – is
heavily dependent upon regional foreign direct
investment (FDI), particularly from Cambodia’s
largest investors, Taiwan and Malaysia. This
investment is to a great extent attracted by
Cambodia’s export quotas to the USA which ended
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Table 1 Top ten investors in Cambodia, cumulative investments, 1994–2002
Number Country Investment capital Percentage
1 Malaysia 1,862,432,052 31.21
2 Taiwan 493,630,670 8.27
3 USA 434,201,401 7.28
4 China 267,064,156 4.48
5 Hong Kong 253,576,213 3.95
6 Singapore 224,592,946 3.76
7 Korea 208,708,623 3.5
8 Thailand 198,674,735 3.33
9 France 192,764,327 3.23
10 United Kingdom 94,083,532 1.58
Source Thoraxy (2002).
in January 2005. The garment industry has been the
main contributor to Cambodia’s growth and poverty
reduction performance.
FDI in other sectors remained low throughout the
1990s and figures for the total number of FDI
dollars spent, rather than merely pledged, in all
sectors, have fallen consistently since 1998, from
more than US$ 230million in 1998 to US$ 113million
in 2001 and below US$ 100million in 2002 and
2003 (World Bank 2004b: 3). Surveys of investors
found that Cambodia was seen as a high-cost and
unstable business environment, suggesting that the
sustainability of the rates of growth posted during
the 1990s is questionable. Cambodia’s major
investors are its regional neighbours, with Malaysia
accounting for up to 40 per cent of FDI to
Cambodia in 2002 (Freeman 2002).
With respect to human development, the growth of
the population at 2.5 per cent per year to an extent
offsets the impact of economic growth on incomes.
In particular, the expansion of the population group
aged 10–19 years during the late 1990s entailed
increased underemployment as lack of growth in
both agriculture and off-farm employment failed to
soak up the new labour coming onto the market.
The narrow concentration of the economic growth
that has occurred in urban areas has prompted the
emergence of wide disparities in income. In 1999,
per capita income in Phnom Penh was US$691,
compared with a rural per capita income of only
US$197. According to the Asian Development Bank,
the incidence of poverty in Phnom Penh is 11 per
cent, as compared to 30 per cent in other urban
areas, and 40 per cent in rural areas. The Bank
reports that ‘Urban per capita consumption
expenditure is nearly twice the rural level and the
average urban dweller can expect to live five years
longer and reach a higher level of educational
achievement (ADB 2000).’ Although there has been
some improvement in Cambodia’s human
development index – from 0.543 in 1995 to 0.556 in
2001, representing an average of 0.00217 per year –
this is a very limited pace of progress given the end
of the war and influx of aid worth more than US$
5billion over this period. In the ‘Human Poverty
Index’, Cambodia fares even worse – 70th out of 95
developing countries in 2004, and the lowest ranked
country in Asia (UNDP 2004).
The question of whether Cambodia has ‘turned
around’ requires investigation of whether the
Cambodian government is actively addressing the
concerns raised above through attempts to improve
both governance and government. In collaboration
with donors, the ruling CPP in 1999 conceived a
Governance Action Plan, intended to rationalise and
reform the state to create a better foundation for
policies to foster pro-poor economic growth. The
commitment of the CPP to the Plan appears to
waver in response to the election cycle. In 1999 and
in 2004, following tense electoral stand-offs
resolved in the CPP’s favour, the party has declared
its intention to wage war on poverty and corruption.
However, in the 1999–2003 electoral cycles, reform
activity declined as elections approached.
1.1 Historical background
From the late 1960s, when the Vietnam War spilled
over onto Cambodian territory, to the collapse of
the Soviet Bloc in 1989, Cambodia suffered a civil
war prompted and sustained by repeated and cynical
foreign interventions reflecting external geopolitical
interests. The devastating impact of these on the
Cambodian population, territory, infrastructure and
state rendered any kind of performance in the 1980s
practically impossible. The party of state of the 1980s
– the CPP – emphasises its achievements in those
years as the re-emergence of a rudimentary
economy, the re-establishment of a basic education
system and of religious observance, and the more or
less successful defence of the country from a
Western-, Chinese- and ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations)-backed insurgency that
included the feared National Army of Democratic
Kampuchea (NADK). Given the context, the CPP’s
pride in these achievements must be respected.
However, state power in the 1980s was weak, as the
Vietnamese occupation undermined the legitimacy of
the regime. Conscription, rice procurement, taxation,
collectivisation and even retention of population in
Phnom Penh-controlled areas were all problematic
throughout the 1980s. Assessments of Cambodia’s
economic, social and political performance during the
1990s should bear in mind the difficulties faced by the
state in performing even the most basic functions of
government in the 1980s.
With the collapse in 1989 of the geopolitical
framework that had sustained the civil war, the
various Cambodian parties were pressured by their
various external backers into a UN peace deal which
was far from reflecting an elite pact on the part of
the Cambodians themselves. Indeed, the history of
the 1990s can be summed up as the attempt by
various Cambodian parties to gain maximum
advantage from a new international framework
characterised by peacekeeping, international aid, and
foreign trade and investment. The CPP proved most
adept at this, and consequently dominates
Cambodian politics in the early 2000s.
The reform era began with the shift to a free market
economy, implemented by the CPP’s State of
Cambodia regime in 1989. Economic liberalisation
was followed in 1991 by a peace agreement,
intended to end Cambodia’s longstanding civil war,
integrate the country into international regimes of
trade, aid and investment, and set the country on
the road to liberal democracy. The implementation
of the peace process by a UN peacekeeping force
culminated in elections and the promulgation of a
new constitution in 1993, which enshrined principles
of liberalism, pluralism and democracy.
The reforms introduced in Cambodia in 1989 were,
of course, primarily aimed at maximising political
power, as exercised by the state and the incumbent
party; but to a significant extent, this goal has proved
to be at odds with the objective of creating an
environment conducive to stimulating investment
(foreign or local) or promoting the welfare of the
poor – that is, it has worked against the prospect of
sustained turnaround despite an early peace dividend.
Economic reforms have concentrated economic
assets, particularly land and natural resources, in the
hands of entrepreneurial groups sympathetic to the
CPP. In part, this was associated with conflict
reduction, as it prompted defections of insurgents in
the mid-1990s. However, in part also, this has been
used to cement the dominance of the CPP over
Cambodian politics, and the dominance of Prime
Minister Hun Sen over the CPP. The continued
striving to accumulate wealth to consolidate political
power reflects the experience of state weakness vis-
à-vis armed challenge by insurgency in the 1980s, on
the threat perceptions of the CPP leadership in the
1990s. Electoral challenges by opposing political
parties, themselves descended from the resistance of
the 1980s, are seen as threatening both to the party
and the national interest. Both the reaction of the
CPP to the opposition, and the continued refusal of
the opposition to regard Prime Minister Hun Sen, in
particular, as a legitimate political contender,
reflects the difficulty of transforming civil war
combatants into coexisting contenders for power.
2 Government approaches to turnaround
2.1 Promoting economic growth through
liberalisation
The economic liberalisation process in 1989
comprised several elements: privatisation of land;
legalisation of private enterprise; sell-off of state
owned enterprises; abandonment of state purchasing
and agricultural tax; and gradual reduction of state
controls on prices, imports and movements of
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goods, to create a unified and market-determined
price structure. In part, these reforms merely
recognised the creeping de facto abandonment of
socialist command economics in progress throughout
the 1980s. Political events from 1989 to 1993,
however, influenced the outcome of these reforms,
and the prospects for conflict resolution, economic
growth and human development.
The reforms were in large part motivated by a
changing external political environment, which put
pressure on the State of Cambodia and the CPP to
negotiate an end to the war. From 1979, the regime
had fought insurgent armies, including the NADK
which represented the infamous Pol Pot regime of
1975–9. The political wings of these armies formed
an exiled Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea, a body which received diplomatic
recognition in the region and in the West and
occupied Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations.
From the late 1980s, the decline in Soviet power,
the desire for de-escalation between the Soviet
Union and China, and concern on the part of
Vietnam to implement its own economic reforms
and to engage more closely with ASEAN and the
West, reduced external support for the State of
Cambodia regime. Vietnamese forces began
withdrawing from Cambodia in 1986; the last troops
left in 1989. Concomitantly, Western countries
desired to distance themselves from a political entity
that included the notorious ‘Khmer Rouge’ (Solarz
1990), while the booming, capital-rich tigers of
ASEAN sought to ‘turn battlefields into
marketplaces’ and exploit cheap labour in Indochina
(Snitwongse 2001). Externally, Cambodia’s civil war
ceased to make strategic sense to either side.
Internally, the decline of the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance, aid which accounted for 90
per cent of the Phnom Penh government’s budget
until 1990, prompted a need for new sources of
financial aid. More generally, by 1989, the limits to
the state-building project of the 1980s had become
apparent. The regime required a new basis for
promoting its legitimacy, for gaining acceptance,
internally and externally, of its authority, and for
strengthening its power.
Elite pacting was one option – exchanging power-
sharing for a sounder basis for political stability and
economic growth. However, a political solution,
involving an accommodation with political leaders
from the resistance armies, was viewed as high risk
by the CPP leadership. Many in the CPP viewed the
resistance armies as a genuine threat, not only to
the CPP but to the whole country. The ‘return of
the Khmer Rouge’ was genuinely to be feared, and
the international actors who participated in UNTAC
had, at least indirectly and diplomatically, supported
the NADK throughout the 1980s. For many in the
CPP, UNTAC’s mandate to create a ‘neutral political
environment’ for elections represented an attempt
by Western powers to break down the flimsy
floodgates to chaos and genocide, erected in the
1980s at the cost of much bloodshed. The leaders of
the CPP had narrowly escaped Pol Pot’s purges by
fleeing to Vietnam in 1978; for them, their personal
safety and the safety of the nation was contingent
upon their own continued grip on national security.
The cooperation of State of Cambodia leaders in a
UN political settlement which included the ‘Khmer
Rouge’, still led by Pol Pot himself, was forced by
their lack of other options, in the light of
Vietnamese withdrawal and Soviet pressure but was
never enthusiastic.
In fact, the CPP designed a solution which drew
economic reform into the service of political
strategy. The emergence of a free market in land and
goods before the initiation of a peace process was
initially popular with ordinary farmers; it also quickly
permitted the establishment of networks of
protection and patronage permitting wealth
accumulation by members of the state and military.
By these means, the fragile ideological basis of state
cohesion of the 1980s could be replaced by a more
solid structure of material self-interest. Economic
reform was not merely designed to facilitate
Western aid and investment but to ensure that both
existing domestic and new incoming assets were
concentrated in the hands of loyalists.
Achieving this goal required the erection of a
regulatory framework that favoured those with
power and official/political connections. This has
been evident in the land and forestry sectors, in
particular. The Land Law of 1992, for example,
contributed to widespread expropriation of land
through its multiple inadequacies. It failed to clearly
distinguish between state and private land, and made
no provision for registering state land, prompting
officials to claim that state land was used and
therefore ‘owned’ by themselves as private citizens. It
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failed to clearly delineate a regime for state
compulsory purchase of land, or to establish
mechanisms for review of this, allowing land
expropriation by state officials.
The Land Law established a labyrinthine process for
registering ownership rights, requiring written
submissions that were problematic for the almost
two-thirds of Cambodians who are functionally
illiterate.
1
This involved several layers of government,
contributing to the proliferation of corruption. It
defined possession as the issue of local authority
receipts acknowledging possession, rather than the
act of occupancy itself, entailing that ownership
rights could be obtained by those who bribed the
local authorities to issue receipts, rather than by
those who actually occupied the land. It failed to
ensure transparency or openness of cadastral records
and implemented a ‘race’ regime in registration,
whereby ownership was granted to whoever
registered first. This concentration of landholdings
permitted regime insiders to establish a new basis for
wealth and power that could insulate them from the
effects of ongoing political reforms (Williams 1999).
These shortcomings permitted those with political
connections, money to pay bribes, or the means to
resort to violence to appropriate land by means of
corruption or force. Victims of such expropriations
had little recourse. The courts were weak, corrupt
and intimidated by the powerful. Thousands of
complaints were sent to the UN, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and the National Assembly’s
committee for receiving complaints, with variable
success. Victims of expropriation were often seen
demonstrating outside the palace or the National
Assembly but these organs were unable or unwilling
to provide redress in most cases. In 2002, it was
estimated that 200,000 poor Cambodians were
victims of ongoing, as-yet-unresolved cases of large-
scale land seizures (Cooper 2002). Landlessness has
increased in Cambodia since 1989, in part because of
expropriation (the cause of landlessness in 13 per
cent of cases, according to an Oxfam survey) and in
part because of distress sales due to the need to
raise money for healthcare, or due to lack of food
(Williams 1999). At the same time, off-farm
employment has not increased, and natural
resources, such as forests and fisheries, which
provide alternative resources for the landless, have
been privatised with deleterious effects on access for
the poor.
While current, donor-led efforts to simplify land
registration and reduce corruption associated with it
may provide some relief, human rights groups are
concerned that to a great extent, these efforts are
codifying and legitimising the dispossession of the
1990s (Saray 2003). Meanwhile, some donor
representatives in Phnom Penh privately speculate
that government resistance to establishing a land tax
is due to the concentration of landholdings in the
hands of the political elite.
This mode of marketisation, which also extends to the
privatisation of other natural resources and state assets,
had far-reaching implications for ‘turnaround’. Broadly,
the processes described facilitated conflict resolution
and political change, although in a manner antithetical
to the liberalism and democratic inclusiveness envisaged
in the 1993 Constitution. Although Cambodia has
successfully maintained macroeconomic stability, there
has been little inward foreign investment outside the
special case of the garment industry, and rates of
economic growth remain hostage to the political
concerns of vested interests. The benefits of aid
projects and of such economic growth that has
occurred have remained firmly in the hands of the
already-rich and the well-connected.
2.2 Conflict resolution and post-conflict
governance
The implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements
by UNTAC fell short of what was intended,
particularly with regard to actually ending the civil
war. The Peace Agreements linked demilitarisation
with promotion of electoral democracy. The four
armies prosecuting the civil war agreed to cease fire,
disarm and demobilise ahead of elections, during
which their respective political wings would compete
peacefully for the popular mandate. UNTAC would
police the ceasefire, ensure the withdrawal of
‘foreign forces’, implement the elections and oversee
government to ensure a level playing field upon
which to compete for votes.
In the event, UNTAC was unable to maintain the
ceasefire, following the withdrawal of the Party of
Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) from the peace
process.
2
UNTAC ploughed on with the election
despite a terror campaign by the NADK and they
were rewarded by a high voter turnout on polling
day. The elections permitted two of the three main
resistance parties to enter a coalition government
with the CPP. The greater legitimacy of this
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government, internally and externally and the
attractiveness of the international aid it beckoned,
ultimately led to the collapse of the NADK and PDK
as political players. The war ended in 1999.
However, the end of the war has not been
associated with a demilitarisation of society. The
armed forces remain both numerically large and
politically influential. Continuing militarisation
throughout the 1990s was associated with a
continued background noise of human rights abuse,
use of violence in the expropriation of resources,
widespread ownership of weapons with the
associated potential for social and domestic violence,
and vulnerability in economic and social life, as well
as in political life, on the part of those who lack
connections in the armed forces, as opposed to
those who have such connections.
The return of the PDK to insurgency prompted
UNTAC in 1992 to abandon its mandate to canton,
disarm and demobilise troops from the other three
armies. These three armies were integrated
following the elections to form a new Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). Many of the
problems that continued to dog Cambodian politics
and economics through the 1990s emerged from the
nature of the RCAF and the way it evolved over the
course of the 1990s, from an unlikely amalgam of
partisan groups to a, superficially at least, solid
supporter of the CPP.
The RCAF in 1994 numbered 160,000, including
2,000 generals and 10,000 colonels (Shawcross
1994: 90–1). In the early 1990s, it mirrored the
development of the civil service and, subsequently,
the ranks of political appointments in government,
in that it ballooned to accommodate political allies
and their networks of followers. Downsizing was
resisted not primarily because of the need to
continue to prosecute a war against the NADK.
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Indeed, many soldiers listed on the payroll were
‘ghosts’, who had died, deserted or never existed.
Overhaul of the military has been resisted for three
reasons. First, in the early 1990s, the competition
between the rival parties in the coalition
government to strengthen their own partisan
networks within the military prompted resistance to
the downsizing of their own men. Second, in the
mid-1990s, as the PDK began to collapse, the
military operated as a haven for defecting NADK
commanders, accommodated complete with their
troops. These commanders were wooed by rival
politicians in Phnom Penh in an effort to tilt the
balance of loyalties within the armed forces. It was
this contest which provoked a brief return to armed
struggle between the CPP and FUNCINPEC – a
struggle which the CPP won in the battle in Phnom
Penh in July 1997.
Subsequently, a third stage began in which the RCAF
solidified as a bastion of CPP loyalty. Between July
1997 and the start of election campaigning in June
1998 40–60 FUNCINPEC military leaders were
assassinated, effectively destroying the FUNCINPEC
military network. From that time, the RCAF has
operated as a fount of CPP power in rural
Cambodia, and this offers a further reason for
continued reluctance on the part of the CPP-
dominated government to downsize.
Rationalisation of the military remains politically
difficult for leaders in Phnom Penh because it would
alienate generals who, since 1989, have developed
extensive business interests based upon control of
lucrative resources or transportation routes. Concern
to retain or attract the support of military generals
has constituted the single most important driving
factor of Cambodian politics outside of electoral
politics, since 1994. Competition over military
allegiances continues to be evident between factions
within the CPP, and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party
has targeted middle-ranking military officers in its
own recruitment strategies. Demonstrable military
support is not only the trump card to be played in
bargaining over the formation of coalition
governments and in the conduct of intra-coalition,
or government-opposition relations but is also an
electoral issue. One recent survey showed that 24
per cent of the population base their voting decision
primarily on concerns to keep the peace, indicating
that not merely politicians but also voters seek to
propitiate the military to prevent a return to warfare
(Asia Foundation 2003: 49).
Because support of the military remains critical to
civilian politics, the Phnom Penh government has
continually ploughed resources into the military.
Defence expenditures reached 50 per cent of the
government’s total budget in the mid-1990s, and
regularly ate into allocations for basic services such as
education and health. Total government expenditure
on education, health, rural development and
agriculture only exceeded expenditure on defence
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and security for the first time in 2002, four years
after the war ended, despite dire needs in the service
sectors, and the identification of rural development,
as early as 1995, as ‘the Royal Government’s ultimate
objective’ (RGC 1994: 26). In short, the threat
perceptions of politicians required to share power in
the aftermath of civil war have prompted political
strategies in which the support of various sections of
the military loom large as resources of power. This
has produced a military that devours international aid
and dominates important sectors of the economy –
particularly the natural resources sector – and which
increasingly appears as the ‘tail that wags the dog’.
Initially justified by CPP concerns that the peace
process would unleash chaos and renewed
‘genocide’ by the ‘Khmer Rouge’, the process by
which the military were allowed to accumulate
significant economic interests and networks of
entrepreneurship has created a situation in which
reform is doubly difficult. The military controls many
of the most profitable natural resource industries in
the country, and acts as a welfare machine for
thousands of soldiers. Thus it wields economic and
electoral power, beyond its capacity for violence.
These power resources are presently mobilised in
support of the CPP (Hendrickson 2001). A World
Bank-funded project to assist with demobilisation of
30,000 troops, which began in 2001, three years
after the war ended, was suspended in 2003 after
reports that demobilisation allowances were being
collected by ‘ghost’ soldiers. CPP insiders had long
reported privately that plans for donor-assisted
demobilisation were viewed within the party and the
military primarily as money-making opportunities,
which could add to slush funds to keep the alliance
between the military and the party solid.
Militarisation has skewed Cambodia’s economic
development particularly in rural areas.
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In the
logging industry, for example, there have been
reports of the military awarding concessions illegally;
hiring out personnel to guard both legal and illegal
concessions, including against local villagers
attempting to continue with customary use of the
forest; demanding and receiving bribes in exchange
for permitting the transportation or smuggling of
logs; and intimidating non-governmental or
governmental actors who attempt to interfere with
this trade (Hughes and Conway 2003). The military
have performed a similar function with respect to
fishing lots and land concessions. This has a number
of effects which are not conducive to ‘turnaround’.
In terms of governance, it prevents the emergence
of rational plans for the use of resources and entails
the continued weakness of regulatory institutions of
government. With regard to the business
environment, it imposes costs for legal operators
forced to pay bribes and it creates a climate of
insecurity and illegality which discourages reputable
investors from investing. Furthermore, it increases
the burden on the poor with far-reaching
implications for growth in the agricultural sector,
and, consequently, human development, as it
impedes domestic investment in small-scale
enterprise and in improving the productivity of family
farms.
Similar dynamics are evident in the civilian state
apparatus. This has also been used by the CPP as a
power base, and corruption has flourished as a result
of political imperatives to protect public servants and
cement their political loyalty. The central civil service
suffers from similar problems as the military.
Numerically, it is bloated, as contending parties resist
the downsizing of their own supporters. In terms of
efficiency, it functions extremely poorly, primarily
because the level of remuneration is insufficient to
support an individual or family. Many civil servants
remain on the payroll only to benefit from ‘insider
status’ and connections but have stopped going to
work in order to pursue secondary occupations in
the private sector. Others depend upon the abuse of
their position for rent-seeking to generate income.
This has not merely reduced the efficiency of the
civil service but has actually transformed civil servants
into obstacles to economic activity, to be assuaged
with a flow of gifts and bribes. Wealthy cliques and
networks of corruption have emerged within the
bureaucracy, as within the military – a development
which furthers the potential for political factionalism
within the civil service as state officials look to
political leaders to protect their various scams.
That the government has actively supported this
mode of development is evident from a number of
policy failures in the 1990s. For example, a notorious
article in the new ‘Civil Servants Law’, produced in
line with the requirements of the 1993 Constitution,
effectively institutionalised impunity for corrupt or
abusive actions on the part of state and military
officials, by determining that courts wishing to try
such officials must gain the permission of the
accused’s superior before issuing a summons or
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making an arrest. Although subsequently repealed in
1998, this article reflected an apparent intention in
the 1990s to strengthen the executive at the
expense of other arms of government.
Equally, attempts to professionalise the civil service
or the judiciary by, for example, raising salaries and
reducing the need for bribe-taking, have been
continually avoided. Donor-led rationalisation plans
have been accepted in principle but resisted in
practice, as have plans for legal and judicial reform
that could transform the courts from corrupt and
inaccessible tools of the government into a
meaningful arena for review. Meanwhile, the
number of explicitly political posts and sinecures in
the government and state have mushroomed, both
through the award of hundreds of paid positions of
‘prime ministerial adviser’, the creation of an
appointed Senate in 1998, and the expansion of the
number of cabinet posts from 80 to 207 in 2004.
Lack of professionalism in the civil service emerging
from this situation, has implications for the
government’s performance in macroeconomic
policy. The Royal Government has been praised for
the ‘tight budgetary discipline’ that has
underwritten a stable exchange rate and low
inflation throughout the past decade. However,
such budgetary discipline is possible because of the
non-functioning of the civil service and military as
arms of the state and the transformation of them
into networks of entrepreneurial interest instead.
The loyalty of state and military functionaries is
attracted through the provisions of goods that do
not appear in the national budget, reducing pressure
to raise salaries. Budgetary discipline in a climate of
severe dearth also shows the disempowerment of
the service ministries – indeed, the lack of any
constituencies within the state or society capable of
demanding resources from the government. The
result is poor health and education services and the
continued levying of informal fees on patients and
parents. This has far-reaching effects on human
development and on the rural economy – the single
most common cause of landlessness is the sale of
land to pay the high costs of accessing healthcare
(Williams 1999).
At the same time, other elements of
macroeconomic policy – notably, the attempt to
increase revenue flows – have enjoyed only limited
success. Schemes to release revenue through
regulated exploitation of forest resources were
instituted in the mid-1990s but have been dogged by
the tendency to illegality and corruption. Efforts to
promote tighter customs regimes and tax collection
have enjoyed very limited success – despite pressure
from donors, government revenue only managed an
increase of 1.7 per cent of gross domestic product
(GDP) between 1999 and 2004, rising from 10.2 per
cent to 11.9 per cent (IMF 2004).
2.3 Implications for human development
The implications of the above for human
development are already clear. The Cambodian
government has continually de-prioritised pro-poor
policy in favour of policies that preserve the power
of vested interests. Services such as health and
education have been de-prioritised in government
spending, in favour of diversion of resources to the
military. The privatisation of land and natural
resources has occurred violently, with a lack of
transparency, and with little attempt to ensure
accessibility to legal process by the poor and illiterate.
Ongoing militarisation and the subjection of the
judiciary and National Assembly to an overbearing
and entrepreneurial executive has entailed that
channels for the expression of grievance are few and
ineffectual.
So far, the results of economic and political reform
for the poor has been dispossession on a grand scale.
The poor have been increasingly excluded from the
customary use of fisheries and forests, and have been
driven from their land. In these circumstances, the
ability of poor families to access healthcare and
education, to invest in their own means of
production, or to advance by any other means
beyond bare subsistence has been extremely limited.
As a result, although there have been no survey-
based national poverty estimates since 1999, the
balance of evidence suggests that poverty has
declined only slightly, if at all, since 1993, despite
more than ten years of high average growth rates.
3 Donor efforts to sponsor turnaround
Donor efforts to sponsor turnaround can be broadly
divided into two overlapping phases. The first phase,
from the first meeting of the International
Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia in
1993 to the emergence of the CPP-led government
in 1998, focused upon structural adjustment for
macroeconomic stability, together with provision of
humanitarian assistance and aid for rehabilitation via
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externally funded projects. The second phase, from
1998, reflected a concern by donors to tackle the
structural problems outlined above, through a focus
on reform of governance. Through both phases,
donors have been awarded considerable prestige by
the level of aid that has flowed to Cambodia but this
prestige has not been converted effectively into
influence over the actual functioning of the state.
3.1 Donor approaches 1993–8
Western donors entered Cambodia in the early
1990s following ten years of non-recognition and
embargo of the SoC government. Deep distrust
between international organisations and the SoC
was evident during the UN peacekeeping operation
and continued for much of the 1990s, arguably until
it became plain to most Western diplomats in
Phnom Penh that FUNCINPEC – the main political
alternative to the CPP and winner of the 1993
elections – was poorly led and unviable as a political
movement in the long run.
The first phase of donor engagement, until that
realisation struck home, has been criticised on two
main grounds: lack of coordination among donors
and distrust of the ‘existing administrative structures’.
During this period, a high proportion of aid was
delivered in the form of substitution technical
assistance, and projects were implemented via
Project Implementation Units staffed by officials
taken out of the state, given salary supplements, and
set to work essentially for donors, resulting in a lack
of national ownership, limited impact in terms of
capacity, and reduced pressure on the government
to put its own house in order (Mysliwiec 2003).
To a great extent, this focus was the result of donor
perceptions that were politically tinged with Cold
War propaganda. For example, the presumption
that the state itself ‘lacked capacity’ ignored the
experience of the previous decade, in line with the
view put forward in Cold War propaganda that the
PRK regime had been merely a façade for
Vietnamese administration. Equally, donor reluctance
to engage with the politicised state apparatus
reflected the hope, in the early 1990s, that
democratisation would affect the task of state
reform. Aside from mandating UNTAC to oversee
the ‘existing administrative structures’ during the
lead-up to elections, no strategy was articulated,
internationally or locally, for effecting a de-
politicisation of the Cambodian state.
Electoral democracy as it has developed in Cambodia
has exerted insufficient scrutiny to affect this task.
Progressives in both the CPP and FUNCINPEC have
been marginalised in favour of those surrounding
Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh, respectively, who
have participated zealously in the politics of slush
funds, gift-giving, patronage and rent-seeking.
Donors missed the opportunity to engage with the
bureaucracy at an early stage in the reform process,
when the old order had broken down and the
nature of the new was as yet uncertain. Chances to
cultivate new attitudes, promote new incentive
structures, promote reformers and boost their
morale and empower a new code of professional
ethics were missed. By the time donors considered
reform of the civil service as a first step towards
addressing structural problems in the Cambodian
economy, the new networks of corruption were
institutionalised along with associated attitudes, and
the most enthusiastic participants in these networks
had been elevated to the highest positions in both
party and state, and were capable of acting as
influential brakes on reform processes aimed at
promoting turnaround.
At the same time, relatively little attention was paid
by donors, in the early years, to ensuring the
penetration of aid beyond the city. The paucity of
infrastructure, continued civil war and unclear lines
of authority in rural areas entailed a concentration of
aid disbursement in Phnom Penh. Curtis (1998)
reports that Phnom Penh, with 10 per cent of the
Cambodian population, received nearly one-third of
the total external assistance in 1994 and 37 per cent
in 1995. Countrywide programmes or activities
supported through donor assistance – to a
considerable extent staffed and managed from the
capital – accounted for 53 per cent of total
disbursements in 1994 and only 47 per cent of total
disbursements in 1995 (Curtis 1998: 82–3). Over the
whole five years of the ‘Royal Cambodian
Government’s First Socio-Economic Development
Plan’ (1996–2000), allocation of public investment
expenditures was highly unequal: 65 per cent went
to projects in urban areas, as opposed to 35 per cent
to rural areas (UNDP 2001: 7). The bias towards the
city reinforced top-down notions of both
democratisation and development prevalent among
the Cambodian political elite. In 2004, government
development planning continues to be based around
the unveiling of infrastructure and school-building
projects by political leaders.
3.2 Donor approaches after 1998
After 1998, donor approaches to reform altered. The
CPP victory in the July 1998 elections prompted
donors to reassess and to focus on structural reform.
Capitalising on the CPP’s concern to win international
recognition of its 1998 election victory, donors
increased the frequency of Consultative Group
meetings, and drafted a Governance Action Plan
(GAP), establishing mixed donor–government working
groups to tackle key issues. The key issues identified
were: legal and judicial reform; improvements in public
finance; improvements in governance; anti-corruption;
gender equity; demobilisation; and natural resource
management. The GAP produced detailed action
plans in all these areas, with priorities and evaluatory
benchmarks specified. However, in 2004, there has
been limited progress towards achieving the goals set
out in it (IMF 2004).
There are a number of reasons for this. In certain
areas, for example, legal and judicial reform, there is
a lack of political will on the part of government to
take serious measures to tackle the problems: a
member of the Legal and Judicial Reform Working
Group in early 2003 privately described the Group as
‘dysfunctional’. Continued intervention by the
executive in the workings of the judiciary has been
evident in 2003 and 2004, including the arbitrary
suspension of a judge who failed to toe the party
line with respect to the killing of a prominent union
leader. Progress on public administration reform has
been slow: the functional review of the civil service
has run into repeated problems. Demobilisation has
been suspended; and in early 2003, the
internationally respected official government forestry
watchdog, Global Witness, was sacked by the
government and replaced by a new agency, widely
viewed as insufficiently assertive.
The one area that has seen real progress has been
decentralisation, following the commune elections
of 2002. In part, decentralisation can be seen as part
of a strategy to promote CPP power. For example,
the model of commune administration selected –
multi-member councils comprising political party
representatives elected on the basis of proportional
representation and party lists – renders councillors
accountable primarily to their party rather than
directly to the electorate and ensures a significant
political advantage to the largest parties. The
commune elections were perhaps the least open of
Cambodia’s post-UNTAC elections, particularly with
regard to access to the electronic media. Given the
CPP’s local strength across the territory, which far
outstrips any other party, efforts to deconcentrate
governmental functions and decentralise power
away from the more plural political arena of Phnom
Penh arguably increases the advantage of the CPP
over its political rivals. However, decentralisation in
the form of commune elections, combined with
extension of the elected Village and Commune
Development Committees associated with the Seila
Programme also introduced a new grassroots politics
into Cambodia.
5
This is a politics of immediate needs
in the sphere most relevant to subsistence
livelihoods. To the extent that villagers invest in the
new local politics, an opportunity for a more vital
bottom-up reform process opens up.
At national level, however, progress on governance
reforms has been slow. A ‘Rectangular Strategy’
presented by the new government formed in 1994
reiterates commitments in the GAP but recent
donor reports by the World Bank and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) note
that progress on previous commitments is slow or
absent (World Bank 2004a; Calavan et al. 2004).
These problems and delays reflect the underlying
reality of a state and a military that have become
increasingly penetrated by clientelist networks of
rent-seeking and corruption. These networks, once
established, are difficult to break. Having looked to
extra-constitutional methods to bolster state and
party power, it is now increasingly difficult for any
party to move away from these, and plans for
rationalisation of the state and of governance remain
hostage to these vested interests.
4 Outlook for turnaround
In brief, donor impact on turnaround so far has been
limited due to three major reasons. First, the peace
process was perceived by the former combatants
leading the major parties as a new opportunity to
defeat their enemies, rather than a basis for an
inclusive elite pact. This has entailed that politicians
have continued at the same time to politicise and
appease a bloated, entrepreneurial and dangerous
military which operates as a barrier to structural
reform of civilian politics and of important sectors of
the economy.
Second, donor distrust of the state and its capacity
for much of the 1990s led to a lack of substantive
dialogue with government and a tendency to extract
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reformers and put them to work in Project
Implementation Units (PIUs) rather than to attempt
to enhance their role within the mainstream
government structure. As the success of the Seila
Programme showed, in many cases levels or offices
of government which lacked resources and were
desperately seeking to adapt to the rapidly changing
situation may have been open to substantive dialogue
with donors at this early stage but this opportunity
was missed by donors who resolutely pursued non-
governmental or parallel channels for disbursing aid,
and who viewed the state as monolithic in support
of the interests of the centre. The Seila Programme
shows that homing in on the different incentive
structures of different levels and agencies within the
state can be productive in providing the resources
and incentives for government officials to initiate
reforms.
Third, the focusing of aid in urban areas and the lack
of success in penetrating rural Cambodia by donors,
opposition political parties and even the newly
established local NGOs, for much of the 1990s
prevented not only the promotion of reform among
peripheral officials who gained least from central
government strategies and had most impact on the
lives of the poor but also the mobilisation of the
rural poor themselves, in a manner that could
influence trajectories of change in their favour.
Consequently, few pressures have been successfully
placed upon the CPP in a manner that could compel
the party to alter its modus operandi, and donor
initiatives have to a great extent been subverted or
finessed to suit party interests.
The outlook for turnaround depends to a great
extent on progress in these three areas. In the area
of donor–government relations much progress has
been made since 1999 in terms of developing more
constructive relationships, establishing frameworks
for consultation and promoting national ownership
of reform programmes. However, in the
interconnected areas of civil–military and
state–society relations, there are fewer grounds for
optimism. Since 2002, government tolerance for civil
society activism to promote the voice of the poor
has declined, and policing of both political and
entrepreneurial activities by the poor has become
tougher. Although the military’s share of the
government budget has declined to an extent, it
continues to absorb large quantities of aid and to
dominate the natural resource sector, squeezing out
both poor resource users and legitimate
businessmen. The challenge for turnaround in
Cambodia is to translate improved understanding and
verbal agreement in Phnom Penh into a rolling back
of militarisation in the countryside, and greater
tolerance and respect within government for the
economic contribution that can be made by the
poor.
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Notes
1. Some 62.7 per cent of adult Cambodians are illiterate
or semi-literate, according to UNESCO/Ministry of
Education, Youth and Sport survey (2000) ‘Literacy
Rates Much Lower than Estimated’, Cambodia
Development Review 4.2 (2000): 1–4.
2. The PDK alleged that UNTAC had failed to ensure the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country, a
claim based upon the view that all ethnic Vietnamese in
Cambodia represented ‘foreign forces’ – a definition
that UNTAC rejected.
3. Disastrous defeats of government forces in military
actions in 1994 suggested that size did not confer
advantage on the battlefield.
4. Urban areas were rapidly demilitarised after the 1997
military battle, when the victorious Hun Sen ordered a
crackdown on the carrying of weapons and the
deployment of troops and bodyguards in urban areas.
5. The Seila Programme was one of the few international
aid programmes in the 1990s to focus on rural
Cambodia, to work through the state, and to intervene
directly at sub-national level, prescribing new
relationships between provincial, commune and village
planning processes, intended to empower the poor.
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